Dossier · 1918–1944

Franz Neumann

Franz Neumann and the structure of Nazi rule

Chronology

1918–1944

Franz Neumann used his training as a labor lawyer to ask how Nazi rule joined political terror to economic power. In American exile, he wrote Behemoth, an account of the forces holding the regime together. He then worked for the United States government, analyzing Germany and proposing ways to dismantle the power behind its dictatorship.[1]; [2]

Early life and intellectual formation

From socialist students to labor law

Neumann's socialism developed before he joined the Institute for Social Research. Peter Hayes describes him as an active Social Democrat while still a teenager. Lowenthal later recalled helping him and Ernst Fraenkel found a socialist student group in Frankfurt in 1918–1919. His socialism already had an organized setting in student life. These accounts do not show exactly what first persuaded him to become a socialist.[1] (p. ix); [3] (pp. 35–37)

His legal training brought him into a particular socialist approach to the state. Historian Rolf Wiggershaus identifies Hugo Sinzheimer, the labor-law scholar with whom Neumann worked in Frankfurt, and the Austrian Marxists Karl Renner and Otto Bauer as important influences. Neumann taught workers and represented unions. In 1928 he opened a Berlin practice with Fraenkel. This work put questions of bargaining power, property and legal protection inside the same professional life.[4] (pp. 223–224)

Ideas and political aims

Capitalism remained part of the explanation

Neumann's own 1930 essay on the Weimar Constitution shows what he hoped law could achieve. Equal legal rights did not give a worker the same power as an employer. Yet the Constitution's protection of unions and works councils could restrict an owner's authority over workers. Neumann cited Renner and Sinzheimer in explaining that property meant power over people as well as possession of things. He wanted socialist lawyers to develop the Constitution's social provisions and socialist politics to put them into practice.[5] (pp. 29–33, 39–43)

This was a route toward socialist change through constitutional institutions, not satisfaction with capitalism as it stood. It also separated him from socialists who thought Weimar offered no useful way forward. Answering Kirchheimer's question about what should follow Weimar, Neumann urged that its possibilities first be used. The disagreement existed inside the socialist camp before their later collaboration in exile.[5] (pp. 42–43)

He found a society in which the party, state officials, armed forces and large businesses exercised power through different organizations. The regime crushed independent opposition while its ruling groups bargained with one another. His concluding account called this a breakdown of the state as an order governed by law. That was the point of the book's title: a monster whose power did not rest on a stable legal order.[1] (pp. 459–470)

This account put Neumann at odds with Friedrich Pollock . Pollock's 1941 model of state capitalism asked whether political commands could replace the market as the main guide to production. Neumann thought such models moved too far beyond the evidence about Germany.[1] (pp. 221–228)

For Neumann, private property had not ceased to matter. Large firms still sought profit. Public commands could strengthen their position by limiting competition and destroying independent unions. He described Germany as a private capitalist economy directed by a totalitarian state, using the term “Totalitarian Monopoly Capitalism.”[1] (pp. 256–261)

A cartel offered a concrete example of the problem he studied. Firms could agree to control output or prices, then rely on the state to protect that arrangement. Workers, small businesses and consumers would have fewer ways to resist. In Neumann's argument, dismantling Nazi rule required attention to those economic arrangements as well as the removal of party officials.[1] (pp. 259–264)

Career and activities

Research for the American war effort

The Nazi destruction of that political and legal setting changed his circumstances. After fleeing Germany in 1933, he studied at the London School of Economics and completed a second doctorate in 1936 on the rule of law, the principle that government and citizens should be bound by public legal rules. Harold Laski recommended him to the Institute for Social Research . His American work therefore drew on earlier socialist commitments and the experience of defending workers through institutions that dictatorship had destroyed.[1] (pp. ix–x)

Neumann moved into American government work in 1942. At the beginning of 1943, according to editor Raffaele Laudani, he became deputy chief of the Central European Section in the Office of Strategic Services ' Research and Analysis Branch. His work examined the enemy and the problems an occupation would face. It involved research rather than the field work of an undercover agent.[2] (pp. 2–4)

Major works

Why he wrote Behemoth

His own preface to Behemoth [1] names later exchanges that helped shape the book. Marcuse read parts of the manuscript, Kirchheimer advised on criminal law, and A. R. L. Gurland helped with German industry. Neumann also drew on a memorandum and lectures prepared for the Justice Department's antitrust division in 1938 and 1939. These were specific contributions, rather than proof of a theory shared by every Institute member.[1] (pp. xx–xxi)

The first edition appeared in 1942; Neumann enlarged it in 1944. Writing during the war, he wanted to understand Germany well enough to defeat National Socialism. His preface called military defeat necessary. He also argued that the Allies should separate the German population from the regime by offering a credible democratic alternative.[1] (pp. xix–xx)

Neumann examined what the regime did as well as what its leaders said. He used German newspapers, journals, laws and official publications. A decree could announce one arrangement while officials and businesses followed another. The relation between written rules and actual power was therefore part of his problem.[1] (pp. xx, 227–228)

His October 11, 1944 paper “The Treatment of Germany” proposed a controlled transition toward a democratic and nonaggressive government. It called for elections, a purge of officials associated with aggression and changes to the economic power of large landowners and business. The text contemplated nationalizing the most powerful industrial and financial corporations. These proposals connect his economic analysis to a concrete program for postwar Germany.[2] (pp. 436–449)

The paper remained an internal contribution to debate. Laudani's headnote describes its rejection in favor of more concrete reports. It also records Neumann's explanation that he had written an earlier memorandum for tactical reasons and considered it questionable. The paper shows a proposal advanced within an agency, with an unsettled place in its author's thinking. It cannot stand as an approved American program.[2] (pp. 436–437)

Influence and criticism

Criticism and the limits of official uptake

Behemoth presented Neumann's explanation, written with wartime access to evidence. It should not become a settled account of every cause of Nazism. In the 2009 introduction, Hayes credits the book's lasting questions while challenging its treatment of business as an equal partner of the regime. He points to controls and ownership records that Neumann understated. The disagreement matters because explaining a firm's participation does not by itself establish that it directed state policy.[1] (Hayes introduction, pp. xv–xvii)

The record also imposes limits. Laudani explains that the reports circulated without authors' names and passed through a collective research and editing process. His attributions rest on internal records. The reports establish recommendations produced within an American agency. They do not establish that every recommendation became policy, or that the United States government adopted the Institute's Marxist outlook.[2] (pp. xvii–xix)

The next question is which proposals officials used and what changed as a result. That question requires policy and occupation records beyond the reports themselves.